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Abstract: Trade, economists and trade theorists advise, is a mutually beneficial
exercise. Among this group, a particular set of advocates, claim that “Free Trade” is
in the interest of all parties. As will be demonstrated, Free Trade is not truly “free”
but an exercise of foreign policy and the implementation of policies favouring wealthy
corporate interest groups. Free Trade is controlled by wealthy nations who have
stacked the rules in favour of themselves, and in particular their corporate interests,
and against the poor producers in poor nations. This control is used contrary to
fairness, economic and ecological logic. Fair trade, by way of contrast, is an effort to
balance the benefits of trade between the trading partners, and ensure that a fairer
distribution of the surplus value created by trade ends up in the hands of those who
most need it and produced the goods. This paper looks at a trade agreement, the
USA-Australia FTA which is well suited to a case study of the various aspects of trade
theory, and in particular the fairness, economic and ecological aspects. It deals with
the peculiar situation of Australia, a developed, ally of the USA which happens to be
located in a tropical climate.
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1) INTRODUCTION

Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile described the USA-Australia Free Trade
Agreement as a “once in a lifetime opportunity to integrate Australia with the world’s
largest economy.”1 Once in a lifetime is a breath-taking description. Does this trade
agreement truly meet such standards? Is there reality behind the rhetoric? Similar
rhetoric surrounds much of the discussion concerning international trade2. The WTO,
NAFTA, and various other international trade treaties are presented to the public as
monumental achievements to the benefit of the peoples of the various countries
involved eliminating poverty and brining wealth to untold numbers.3

In part, such claims are part of the neo-classical economists’ neo-liberal political
revolution in western societies in which governments are supposed to take a lesser
role while permitting the efficiencies of private enterprise to deliver equivalent public
goods and services at a lower cost. This paper using the USA-Australia Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) as a case study will examine the trade aspects of the neo-classical
economists’ neo-liberal political agenda, and in particular its economic and political
claim that neo-liberal governments in the developed countries are following a free
1

Quoted in Tim Harcourt, “The Australia United States Free Trade Agreements—what’s it all about:
Balancing pros and cons of the trade deal—what’s it all about?” Australian Trade Commission,
www.austrade.gov.au/corporatel/layout/00,,_S1-1_CORPORXID29-2_2-3_PWB Many similar quotes
can be found in L. Weiss, E. Thurbon, J. Mathews, How to kill a Country: Australia’s Devastating
Trade Deal with the United States (2004), p. 5.
2
Renato Ruggiero, the first director-general of the WTO, claimed that as a result of free trade “the
potential for eradicating global poverty in the early part of the next [twenty-first] century—a utopian
notion even a few decades ago, but a real possibility today” in “Whither the Trade System Next?,” in J.
Bhagwati & M. Hirsch (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond—Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel..
See generally, Jagdish Bhagwati. Protectionism. (1985).
3
Id. An opposite view--that international trade generates a significant economic loss-has been ably
argued by Herman Daly, former economist at the World Bank and founder of the International Society
for Ecological Economics. Daly has argued that the free trade regime is undermining the planet’s
ability to sustain life. His work, Steady-State Economics, remains a landmark in the area of
environment and economics.
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trade agenda. Further, it will examine whether the world’s dominant economy and
dealing neo-liberal government would permit a benefit to those less powerful or less
developed countries that would implement the neo-classical economists’ agenda.4
Finally, it examines the truth of their claim that trade patterns are dictated by
rationality and efficiency. Obviously, using a case study significantly restricts the
generalizability of any conclusion. It is hoped, therefore, that this study serves as an
illustration of an FTA in a peculiarly interesting instance, that of two neo-liberal
nations in opposite hemispheres.

As shall be demonstrated, various theories of trade indicate differing patterns in trade.
One may ask, therefore, what rules determine the patterns and how do they do so?
Perhaps as the neo-classicists suggest, trade follows natural advantages and economic
rationalities. In other words, it may be that where the ecological needs of specific
commodities and economic realities dictate, trade flows in a predictable pattern based
on that logic. Alternatively, it may be suggested that trade patterns are limited to the
relationships between the north and the south as suggested by the Brandt Line. We
may ask therefore: is trade between developed countries free trade, or is there yet a
role to be played or a problem to be addressed as fair trade advocates claim? Perhaps
developed nations treat one another differently than they treat poor nations, or they
may indeed continue a pattern of power exploiting the weak even among the
developed nations. The USA-Australia Free Trade Agreement offers an excellent
opportunity to examine critically the economists’ and trade theorists’ claims about

4

See A. Rands Barros “Challenges of Economic Development” Draft paper prepared for the discussion
at the UNRISD meeting on The Need to Rethink Development Economics., 7-8 September 2001, Cape
Town, South Africa, but a disturbing trend identified even in the 1970’s. See, for example, Gunnar
Myrdal, Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, March 17, 1975,
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1974/myrdal-lecture.html
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free trade agreements: it is an agreement between two developed nations whose main
differences are power and climate: tropical versus temperate.
Both countries have a British heritage from which they received the English language,
legal systems and basic economic policy.5 The USA is a developed country.6 It has
the world’s largest economy, is the world’s largest international trading partner. 7
Australia too is a developed country, but amounts to about one-fourteenth of the USA
in terms of population and considerably less in terms of the size of its economy and
trade.8 It understands its relationship with the USA to be a friendship.9 Its support of
the USA’s, internationally condemned, illegal invasion of Iraq10 added considerable
legitimacy to the “Coalition of the Willing.”11

5

See Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang’s review of trade policies of Great Britain and the USA, in
Ha-Joon Chang “Kicking Away the Ladder: The ‘Real’ History of Free Trade,” Foreign Policy In
Focus, Dec. 2003.
6
Both USA and Australia are ranked in the same category as “High Income” countries by the World
Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm#High_income
7
In 2003 it was responsible for 9% ($724 bn of $7274 bn worldwide) of the world’s exports and 20%
($1306 bn of $7557 bn worldwide) of the world’s imports. WTO, World Trade Report 2004, “Trade
and Trade Policy Developments: Recent Trends in International Trade and Policy Developments,” p. 7.
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr04_1a_e.pdf
8
In 2003 Australia had $70 bn exports and $88 bn imports. World Bank, Australia at a Glance.
http://www.worldbank.org/cgibin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Faus_aag.pdf
9
L. Weiss, E. Thurbon, “Preliminary Submission to the Australian Senate Select Committee,” Enquiry
of the Australian Senate Select Committee into the Free Trade Agreement Between Australia and the
United States of America, 30 April 2004. In the discussion of the countries and identifying various
special interest groups, I am taking both Realist and Liberal approaches to International Relations, see.
R. Beck, “International Law and International Relations: The Prospects for Interdisciplinary
Collaboration” in Beck, Arend and Vander Lugt eds, International Rules: Approaches from
International Law and international Relations.
10
The UN has condemned the invasion. Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that the war was
illegal. “War Illegal—says Annan,” 16 Sept. 2004 BBC World News
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661134.stm For an example of the acrimony see Steven
R. Weisman “A Long, Winding Road to a Diplomatic Dead End” March 17, 2003 New York Times
See the discussion of the specious nature of the USA’s claims and self-contradictions in attempting to
put its case forward, see J. Maogoto, Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspectives On The Use Of Force And
The War On Terror, Chapter IV (forthcoming) (copy of manuscript on file with Author).
11
Denominated as such by G.W. Bush. An indication of the skepticism of even this claim of willing
cooperation can be seen in the mockery of the denomination as the “Coalition of the Bought”, or
“Coalition of the Billing.” Australian negotiators sold the FTA to the public claiming this was part of
the reason they were able to get the deal on the table, L. Weiss, E. Thurbon, J. Mathews, How to kill a
Country: Australia’s Devastating Trade Deal with the United States (2004), pp 140-143
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The USA-Australia Free Trade Agreement is important because it sharpens the focus
on issues and complaints raised by weaker, poor southern countries against wealthy,
powerful northern countries. Wealthy northern countries, instead of addressing
southern countries’ issues and complaints, often simply obfuscate the matter by
reference to some aspect of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Policy, such as
conditionality, and so avoid addressing the issue.12 Australia, however, is not such a
nation, and accordingly the resulting FTA cannot be dismissed as a problematic
consequence of international debtors complying with creditor imposed conditions or
creditors’ other rights. Further, this particular case makes it clear that powerful
northern countries like the USA,13 are concerned only about the economic benefit of
their own wealthy corporations, remain unconcerned with the broader negative
economic and environmental impact of their trade policies, and will use their power to
impose manifestly unfair trade agreements on weaker parties.14 Perhaps most
striking, the USA will impose its will regardless of and even contrary to both
economic and ecological rationality, which form the very basis for neo-classical
economists’ drive for “Free Trade.” I wish to declare from the outset that this piece is
not “anti-USA” as the USA’s actions are no different from other empires of the past:
however, whether it is done in the last century by the UK, two thousand years ago by
Rome, or today by the USA, unfair trade is unfair.15

12

Rigged Rules and Double Standards: trade, globalization, and the fight against poverty, 126-128.
http://www.maketradefair.com/en/index.php?file=26032002105641.htm
13
The USA’s policies concerning trade and the use of violence to implement its policies are not unique,
and indeed may be said to form part of imperial policies traditionally. See for example, Lord
Shelburne’s comment: “England prefers trade without domination where possible, but accepts trade
with domination when necessary.” Quoted in R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, “The Imperialism of Free
Trade,” 6 Economic History Review, (2nd series) (1953) 1-15.
14
The use of USA power is a central tenet of the Bush II Administration and has been a part of its
policy since its inception. In the words of Condoleezza Rice “Great powers do not mind their own
business” in an article in which she advocates USA military adventures to spread America’s “universal
values”. C. Rice, Promoting the national interest, 79 Foreign Affairs, (2000), p. 49.
15
See comment of Lord Shelburne above n. 13.
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2) THE BASICS—TRADE, FAIR TRADE, FREE TRADE

Trade is a contentious issue at the best of times as parties attempt to maximize their
share of the surplus value created in any given transaction. Parties doubt each other’s
intentions and the truthfulness of the other party’s information16—and even after a
deal is negotiated, parties suffer from buyer’s remorse, wondering whether in fact
they received the best deal.17 All trade depends on the perception of value: parties
will trade where one party values its goods less than it values the goods of the other
party, and the other party values in the reverse. In other words, each party perceives
the value of the other’s goods as being greater than the value it places on its own
goods.18 The attractiveness of alternative distributions cause us to engage in the
process of trade continually, never reaching the ultimate equilibrium economists posit
as the point of General Equilibrium Theory.19

For trade to occur, in other words, it must be mutually beneficial to induce the parties
to engage in it and hence, in some way “fair.” If trade is by definition fair, and free
trade is simply forcing the government to extricate itself from introducing distortions
into the marketplace, what can be the objection to free trade? How could it be
anything other than “fair”? If these two questions are based on correct premises, then
there can be no cause for complaint and there can be no basis for fair trade advocates.

16

R. Lewicki, Negotiations, (2003)
Ibid.
18
R. Malloy, Law and Market Economy (2002)
19
See, for example, John R. Hicks – Prize Lecture, The Mainspring of Economic Growth Lecture to
the memory of Alfred Nobel, April 27, 1973, http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1972/hickslecture.html
17
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The argument presented in the previous paragraph is platitudinous at best. Oxfam,
arguably one of the world’s most famous NGO’s, has recently released a study on
trade. Its authors observe:
The international trading system is not a force of nature. It is a system of
exchange, managed by rules and institutions that reflect political choices. Those
choices can prioritise the interests of the weak and vulnerable, or they can
prioritise the interests of the wealthy and powerful…. Trade is reinforcing
global poverty and inequality because the international trading system is
managed to produce these outcomes. The rules of the game reflect the power of
vested interests.20
In other words, it is abundantly clear outside of the sheltered offices of trade
ministers, trade negotiators and big business executives, and particularly those of the
wealthy nations that the current system of rules is an unmitigated disaster for the vast
majority of the world’s population.21
As indicated within, neo-liberal politicians “free trade” has little to do with actually
reducing barriers to trade where the barriers benefit the rich countries, but much to do
with marketing the products of wealthy countries in the markets of poorer countries
while maintaining protections for their own producers at home. Knowledge of this
fact is so wide spread that the WTO talks at Cancun, Mexico in 2003 halted for this
very reason,22 and indeed had been written about in advance.23 The poor countries
simply refused any further participation until their concerns were addressed. In
particular, they insisted that the wealthy nations honour their commitments to

20

Ibid.
“unmitigated disaster” is Stiglitz’ term. See Stiglitz, Globalization, and its Discontents, p. 20.
Numerous studies have attempted to demonstrate to the contrary that trade has helped reduce poverty.
The problem with these studies is that they fail to consider the distribution of wealth in the poor
countries, nor the ecological damage, nor damage to democratic institutions, nor the increased
populations, Including pundits like David Brooks of the NY Times “The Good News about poverty,”
NY Times 24 Nov. 2004,
22
WTO website
23
R. H. Steinberg and T. Josling, “ When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural
Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge, “ 6(2) J. of Intl Econ. Law, (2003).
21
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reducing agricultural subsidies minimal though they may be and make further
commitments.

In response to this united action by the third world, instead of fulfilling promises, the
developed nations of the G-7 scrambled to bring to the fore an idea first raised by Paul
Martin, the then Minister of Trade for Canada—the notion of a G-20.24 The notion is
to expand the G-7 to include some of the larger developing countries. To many it is a
transparent effort to implement a divide and conquer strategy among members of the
third world.25

3) INTERNATIONAL TRADE

International trade has been a part of human history for thousands of years. Evidence
of trade between nations exists in the pre-Hispanic civilizations in meso-America,
where nations traded for precious green stones, in Polynesia where goods and cultural
artefacts were traded between islanders as signs of friendship, in the spread of
Buddhism from its home in northern India throughout China and South East Asia, to
the ancient Phoenician mariners who traded throughout the eastern Mediterranean,
even to Sumer’s connections with India, perhaps some 1,000 years prior to the rise of
Egypt’s pyramids in Giza. Arguably the oldest known international trade was
24

???
Walden Bello and Aileen Kwa “G 20 Leaders Succumb to Divide-and-Rule Tactics: The Story
behind Washington’s Triumph in Geneva” http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/wto/Updates/44.htm
See also, Yuill Herbert, “Divide and Conquer: Bilateral Trade Agreements,” Dominion April 2, 2004.
As noted by The Economist magazine in “Progress at last, but still a long way to go” Aug 2nd 2004,
The Economist Global Agenda concerning the Doha Round “The details of the framework agreement
suggest that the rich countries are now prepared to pay a price to ensure access to the markets of the
bigger, more attractive developing nations, and that price is the freeing-up of their own agricultural
markets. Meanwhile, the poorest countries, in being relieved of many tariff-cutting obligations, have
opted out of the process. So, though the Doha round is back on track, the WTO has, in effect, split into
two tiers: one for those countries that are fully engaged in the round, and one for those that are little
more than bystanders.”
25
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conducted by the Australian Aboriginals with the Macassans in the northern parts of
Australia. Various explanations for international trade have been given.

a) Trade theory
Modern trade theory, explaining the motivations, directions and goods traded, is
usually traced back to Adam Smith. Smith held that nations traded on the basis of
“absolute advantage.”26 That is, nations that have pastures produce sheep for wool,
whereas nations with good vineyards and appropriate climate easily produce wine.
These nations trade wool for wine. David Ricardo is credited with refining Smith’s
theory with a theory known as “comparative advantage.”27 Ricardo pointed out that
where fewer labour inputs were required to produce the same goods in two countries,
trade can be beneficial, even where one country had an absolute advantage in both
goods to be traded. Further advances in trade theory were made by Heckscher-Ohlin
who took factor proportions into consideration,28 by Samuelson and Jones whose
Specific Factors model took into account the immobility of certain factors,29 and more
recently, as advocated by Krugman, The Standard Model, a much more sophisticated
model which considers multiple factors including immobility, the “relationship
between production possibility frontier and the relative supply curve, the relationship
between relative prices and relative demand, determination of world equilibrium, and
the effect of terms of trade.”30 Current international trade indicates that a critical
component of understanding trade is market access.31

26

P. Krugman, M. Obstfelt, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 6th ed. (2003), 20-24.
On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1819)
28
B. Ohlin, Interregional and International Trade (1933) modified and expanded by Heckscher
29
Krugman, above n. 16, 38-66.
30
Ibid, 94. For criticism, See D. R. Davis, D. E. Weinstein, “Market Access, Economic Geography
and Comparative Advantage: An Empirical Assessment” National Bureau of Economic Research, April
1998.
31
Ibid.
27
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i) Free Trade
All of the foregoing trade theory is premised on a notion of free-trade. This basis
leads to a consideration of what free trade is, from both economic and political
perspectives.
(1) Economic Theory
Free trade as advanced by the trade theorists just noted is the notion that the most
beneficial outcomes for the populace will be realized when the supply of goods is
permitted to flow freely to meet demand without government intervention via such
devices as tariffs, quotas and other non-tariff barriers. Its advocates offer great
promise. Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank, outlining the
arguments for free trade writes that: “opening up to international trade has helped
many countries grow far more quickly that they would otherwise have done….
Because of globalization many people in the world now live longer than before and
their standard of living is far better.”32 This is the promise of free trade. It was
developed once the disastrous beggar-thy-neighbour policies—policies which
attempted to support domestic industries and economy at the expense of neighbouring
countries—were identified as harmful and causative with respect to the economic
hardships and a forum for their elimination was set up.33 The current free trade
regime (trade which favours lower levels of government intervention in the market)
follows from the post-Depression and post World War II arrangement of the GATT.
This was a coordinated and united effort among several nations to realize the benefits

32
33

J. Stiglitz, above n. 11, p. 4.
Ibid., 15-16.
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of trade by reducing tariffs jointly, on the theory that unilateral reductions would be
disastrous for countries doing so on an individual basis.34

Accordingly, free trade view appears justified,35 at least in terms of neo-classical
economic theory. Broader measures used by ecological economists indicate that
much trade is in fact an economic negative,36 and indeed, this whole historical
reconstruction appears to be a myth.37 Nations, 38 according to the neo-classicists,
should engage in free trade for their own advantage to increase their economies. In
political practice, however, trade does not follow the neo-classicists’ theory.
(2) Political Reality
Although its advocates have coopted the moniker “free trade”39 actual trade appears
to be quite different, Consider for example, that the self-proclaimed “leader” of free
trade, the USA, “has imposed more dumping penalties against low-priced imports
than… any other government in the world”40 and in the years 1993-1996 implemented
61 laws and unilateral executive actions imposing economic sanctions for foreign
policy purposes, against 34 countries representing 2.3 billion people, being 19% of
the world’s markets.41 Krugman and Obstfelt, citing a study by economists Baldwin

34

The argument that unilateral reductions are harmful to the country doing so do not appear to be borne
out in theory or practice, as most countries tend to do so. On the theory aspect, see J. Bhagawati,
Going Alone.
35
Krugman above n. 16, p. 21-23.
36
H. Daly, above n. 2.
37
See the excellent study by Chang, above n. 5.
38
Again, the neo-classicists appear to ignore the fact that 2/3 of world trade occurs within multinational
corporations, and as such is not susceptible to the national trading theories upon which they rely. G.
Bird and R. Rajan, “Economics Globalization: How Far and How Much Further? Adelaide University:
Centre for International Economics Studies, Discussion Paper 0117, 2001, p. 3.
39
Quotation marks will be used around “free trade” throughout the balance of this paper when referring
to this politicized version of trade.
40
Bovard, The Fair Trade Fraud, (19991) 110.
41
National Association of Manufacturers (March 1997) A Catalog of new US Unilateral Economic
Sanctions for Foreign Policy Purposes 1993-1996. Cited in W. Pengilley, “United States Self Interest:
A Major Impediment to Agreement on the Principles of International Competition and its
Enforcement,” 1(2) J. of International Commercial Law (2002) 187-228., p. 200. For the USA State
Department’s justification of the use of sanctions for foreign policy see Victor Comras, “Economic
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and Magee,42 observe: “it’s hard to makes sense of actual trade policy, if you assume
that governments are genuinely trying to maximize national welfare. On the other
hand, actual trade policy does make sense if you assume that special interest groups
can buy influence.”43 In fact, Krugman has concluded that international trade as it is
currently structured is not based on economics, at all, but on politics.44 Essentially,
then, trade is set up for and dominated by special interest groups—the large multinational corporations, and financial interests,45 and for the political purposes of
subjugation of other nations.46 Such being the case, it is exceedingly important that
the politics of “free trade” be explicated and debated. Unfortunately, it is not. This
matter will be brought up and discussed later.
ii) Fair Trade
Fair trade is an effort to bring the element of fairness discussed earlier back to trade
and to bring focus to the political aspects of trade. It recognizes that there is no
fairness in the current system in which weaker or impoverished nations find their
protections are beaten down in rushed liberalization schemes imposed by the wealthy
nations at the behest of their financiers.47 The hypocrisy of this situation is
exacerbated when one realizes that these very same protectionist schemes were
critical in permitting the developed nations to achieve their developed economic

Sanctions and U.S. Foreign Policy” Remarks to the Open Forum Washington, DC February 25, 2002
http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/9128.htm
42
R. Baldwin, and Christopher S. Magee (2000). Explaining congressional voting on trade bills in the
1990’s: from NAFTA Approval to Fast-Track Defeat. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics.
43
Above n 16, p. 233.
44
P. Krugman, “The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade”, The American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings 83, (1996) 83(2) 362-366.
45
Stiglitz,, above n. 11, p. 9-10, 15-20, 63. et passim.
46
Pengilley, above n. 29, p. 195.
47
Stiglitz, above n. 11, p. 16-17.
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status.48 Perhaps worse, the strong nations maintain those same protections today,
long after they have served their developmental purpose.49
(1) Economic Theory
Fair trade advocates do not categorically reject international trade. They acknowledge
benefits that may be had from international trade but recognize that rapid
liberalization does not work. As Stiglitz writes:
most of the advanced industrial countries—including the United States and
Japan—had built up their economics by wisely and selectively protecting
some of their industries until they were strong enough to compete with foreign
companies. While blanket protection has often not worked for countries that
have tried it, neither has rapid trade liberalization. Forcing a developing
country to open itself up to imported products that would compete with those
produce by certain of its industries… can have disastrous consequences—
socially and economically.50
Furthermore, they accept that there is a role for some government protection of infant
industries and developing manufacturing and other industries in certain instances.51
What they reject is “free trade.” As Stiglitz observes, “The free market ideology
should be replaced with analysis based on economic science, with a more balanced
view of the role of government drawn from an understanding of both the market and
government failure.”52
(2) Political Reality
Essentially, fair trade advocates recognize the scarcity of fairness where small, less
developed countries are negotiating with the proverbial 800 pound gorilla. “Free
48

See Chang, above n. 5. See also, R. Wade, “What strategies are viable for developing countries
today? The World Trade Organization and the shrinking of ‘development space.’” Review of
International Political Economy (forthcoming).D. Rodrick, See also D. Rodrick “Making openness
work: investment strategies” in D. Rodrick ed., The New Global Economy and Developing Countries
(1999), World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (1993), see also, J.
Stiglitz “From Miracle to Crisis to Recovery: Lessons from Four Decades of East Asian Experience” In
J. Stiglitz and S. Yusuf eds. Rethinking the East Asian Miracle (2001). L. Wallach and P. Woodall,
Whose Trade Organization? The Comprehensive Guide To The WTO.
49
Id.
50
Stiglitz, above n. 11, p. 16-17
51
Ibid, pp. 244-252.
52
Ibid, 250.
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Trade” advocates calumniate those who disagree with them by calling them “angry
left”, diagnosing a pseudo psychiatric condition “globaphobes” suffering from
“undying paranoia about American imperialism and global business.”53 They further
claim that fair traders oppose all trade. As just indicated, fair trade advocates
recognize that trade can provide important advantages to both poor and rich countries
and their people;54 however, fair trade advocates acknowledge that in such
relationships, the strong attempt to take advantage of the weak, the rich take
advantage of the poor, and especially, that current rules favour inequitable
distributions from the gains from trade. 55 Specifically, the rules in their current form
transfer wealth from the poor to the rich.56
As the NGO Oxfam, in its extensive study Rigged Rules and Double Standards
advises: “The problem is not that international trade is inherently opposed to the
needs and interests of the poor, but that the rules that govern it are rigged in favour of
the rich.” 57 The authors continue:
the same [wealthy] governments use their trade policy to conduct what
amounts to robbery against the world's poor. When developing countries
export to rich country markets, they face tariff barriers that are four times
higher than those encountered by rich countries. Those barriers cost them
$100bn a year - twice as much as they receive in aid.58
Advocates of fair trade recognize the unfairness of the current trading rules and seek
to have the rules changed to be fairer.

53

Tony Parkinson “Let’s rid the free trade debate of anti-Americanism” The Age, 13, Feb, 2004. cited
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There is irony in the use developed countries make of the term “fair” in discussions of
trade. At times, it is used as an excuse to exclude cheap goods from poor countries,
allegedly “dumped” by those poor countries—although there has yet to be a single
case proved where a poor country has dumped product on a developed country.59 By
alleging dumping, wealthy countries can invoke countervailing duties against the
developing nation and essentially kill that nation’s developing industry during the
time the case works through the system. Such actions, however, are not reserved
exclusively to protect the wealthy from the poor developing nations. The notion of
fair trade has been a major contention between the USA and Japan and resulted in
significant sanctions and acrimony between the nations. As Pengilley observes:
“When it comes to international trade, … even developed nations have erected a
veritable barrage of barriers which prevent or severely inhibit even the most basic acts
of trade taking place or taking place on anything near a level playing field.”60 We
shall return to this later.

4) FAIRNESS

As just indicated, trade as it is currently structured is anything but fair.61 Fairness
itself, however, is a problematic term. It has different connotations in law, policy,
economics, and ethics. Essentially, where fairness is a matter of justice in
distribution, there are two competing approaches.62 One approach examines merit,
essentially focusing on justice from the perspective of dessert—that is, those who
59
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60
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have some meritorious characteristics, or engage in some particular meritorious
activity deserve a particular proportion of the resource(s) in question. The second
approach focuses on the equality of all humanity. This approach starts from the
premise that all humans are of equal value and then evaluates arguments for
distributions which vary from equality.63

a) Fairness in International Trade
In the context of international trade, fairness has a slightly different character. Indeed
fair to one country or one economist is undoubtedly unfair to another, depending, of
course on which dimension one focuses on, and on the perspective one takes. For
example, a neo-classical economist is likely to favour Maximum Benefit Fairness
whereas an ecological economist may have a greater concern for Distributional
Fairness. The USA is notorious for its “fairness” complaints under s. 301 of its Trade
Act 1974,64 which permits USA corporations to instigate investigations alleged unfair
trade practices by foreign corporations by the US Dept. of Trade. These
investigations are initiated against countries trading with the USA in competition with
the USA’s domestic corporations. Although in all likelihood contrary to the USA’s
WTO commitments, the USA has thus far managed to escape WTO censure of this
law.65
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Nobel laureate in economics, Amartya Sen argues that fairness in international trade
is often miscast in debates concerning globalization and development. He observes
that the question is often put as “are the poor getting poorer or richer?”66 essentially, a
Rawlsian test of justice.67 Sen believes that this is not the right question. He states:
“Even if the poor were to get just a little richer, this need not imply that the poor are
getting a fair share of the benefits of economic interrelations and of the vast potentials
of globalization. Nor is it adequate to ask whether international inequality is getting
marginally larger, or smaller.”68

He continues:
To rebel against the appalling poverty and the staggering inequalities that
characterize the contemporary world, or to protest against unfair sharing of
benefits of global cooperation, it is not necessary to show that the inequality is
not only very large, but it is also getting larger.69
Sen sets out the issue from an economic perspective as follows.
When there are gains from cooperation, there can be many alternative
arrangements that benefit each party…. It is necessary, therefore, to ask
whether the distribution of gains is fair or acceptable, and not just whether
there exist some gains for all parties (which can be the case for a great many
alternative arrangements). As J.F. Nash, the mathematician and game theorist,
discussed more than half a century ago…the central issue is not whether a
particular arrangement is better for all than no cooperation at all (there can be
many such alternatives), but whether the particular divisions to emerge are fair
divisions, given the alternative arrangements that can be made.70
And on this point he concludes there is no doubt that international trade as it now is
conducted is far from fair.

66

Amartya Sen Interdependence And Global Justice http://www.un.org/esa/documents/GLOUNGA.pdf
67
Theory of Justice (1971)
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid
70
Ibid.

55256-text.native.1157935488

19

A positivist analysis by economist Steven Suranovic indicates that fairness can be
considered to have two principles: equality and reciprocity.71 More particularly, with
respect to trade, Suranovic claims the two principles may be considered as having
seven dimensions:

1.

Non-Discrimination Fairness,

2.

Distributional Fairness,

3.

Golden-Rule Fairness,

4.

Positive Reciprocity,

5.

Negative Reciprocity,

6.

Privacy Fairness and

7.

Maximum Benefit Fairness.

We will deal briefly with each in turn. Non-Discrimination Fairness, requires equals
to be treated equally. Any right granted or duty imposed on one party is equally
available or imposed on the other.72 Distributional Fairness, requires goods (and
evils) to be distributed equally among equal members. It is a fairness evaluated on
outcomes: that is the outcome of any distribution must ensure that each party or group
receives an amount equal in some way.73 Golden-Rule Fairness, says Suranovic,
requires that no action be taken unless the actor is willing to be subjected to the same
action.74 Positive Reciprocity, permits parties to act so as to gain a benefit from a

71
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receiving party equal to one bestowed on that other.75 Negative Reciprocity, permits
retaliation in kind and quantity in response to a harm done.76 Privacy Fairness
permits parties to act freely insofar as their actions affect only themselves. Actions
which impede this expression of freedom are deemed “unfair.”77 Maximum Benefit
Fairness requires that when a range of benefits are available from an action but only
one outcome can be chosen, the outcome selected must be the one most beneficial in
the aggregate.78 From this brief overview, one can see the legitimacy of the Oxfam,
Sen and the host of developing nation complaints.

If one is committed to the principle of the equality of humans as members of the same
species, a view that informs the UN Charter of Human Rights, one of the most
universally accepted explanations of humanity on the planet, one of the primary
concerns must be the development and protection of the means of human sustenance.
Thus, where institutions, systems and rules support a distribution that fosters their
sustenance, one can argue conclusively that the institutions, systems and rules are fair.
Logically, where institutions, systems and rules support a distribution that undermines
people’s ability to sustain themselves, one can argue conclusively that the institutions,
systems and rules are unfair

5) POLITICS OF TRADE: USA FOREIGN POLICY

The history of wealthy northern nations conquering and controlling poorer southern
nations is both well known and uncontroversial. The interests of those who lived in
75

Ibid, 295.
Ibid, 299.
77
Ibid, 301.
78
Ibid, 302.
76

55256-text.native.1157935488

21

those poor southern nations were disregarded and the countries were essentially
treated as treasury supports for their European masters. This view of the world, of the
developed northern nations, “right and destiny” to conquer and dominate the rest of
the world, however, has carried on long after the collapse of the European empires.
This is particularly true in the case of the USA.

It has been said: “One can colonize by trade or conquest.” The USA has combined
these two methods masterfully. As documented carefully by historian Howard Zinn,
USA’s aggressive foreign policy has been driven by its economic interests. He quotes
Senator Beveridge of 1897 when American foreign policy was still shaping:
“American factories are making more than the American people can use. American
soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the
trade of the world must and shall be ours.”79

America took the policy to its logical military conclusion quite early. Perhaps it is
wise to consider America’s policies in their historical context. One of America’s
most visionary presidents, (often considered to be among the most humanitarian with
respect to foreign affairs,) Woodrow Wilson offered: “Concessions obtained by
financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of
unwilling nations be outraged in the process…”80 He made it perfectly clear that the
voluntariness of trade partners was not a consideration. He stated: “the doors of the
nations which are closed must be battered down.”81 Elsewhere, this same enlightened
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president explained his intention to force trade on the rest of the world which he
described as “the righteous conquest of foreign markets.”82

This approach to foreign policy was carried forward after the end of the Second
World War. In setting up the post-WWII world, the USA supported the pre-war
division of the world among developed countries which were to be served by their
third world colonies. The USA thoughtfully reserved Latin America to itself.83 Lest
these discussion and facts be considered outdated or a sentiment peculiar to a
particular president, consider G.H. Bush’s concern to protect USA oil supplies in
Kuwait claiming that the USA was restoring democracy in the clan bound, autocratic
kingdom, or Madeline Albright’s comments to the UN Security Council concerning
the Clinton Administration’s desire to act against Iraq: “[the US will] behave, with
others, multilaterally when we can and unilaterally as we must.”84 In 2002 US Trade
Representative Ambassador Robert Zoellick has put it plainly: “America's trade
policies are connected to our broader economic, political, and security aims.”85
Zoellick acknowledged that it lacks intellectual coherence. He wrote: “This
intellectual integration may confound some trade scholars.”86 Nevertheless, he makes
USA’s policy abundantly clear: “To be sustainable at home, our trade strategy needs
to be aligned with America's values and aspirations -- as well as with our economic
interests.”87
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As mentioned, the US has done so continually by two methods: the first and obvious
which we are currently seeing in Iraq,88 a policy of invasion of sovereign nations89
and subversion of democratically elected governments,90 and second, by means of
terms of trade, whether through protectionism or embargoes against whomever it
chooses.

Because of the political unpopularity of foreign invasions for commercial purposes
particularly among the lower and middle classes conscripted to fight and die for those
commercial interests,91 and its myths of equality, self-determination, and
democracy,92 the USA has been reluctant to overtly invade and conquer.93 The
exception of course, has been with respect to the aboriginal nations who lived in
North America prior to the European invasion, which after the establishment of the
USA were subject to constant invasions and concerted efforts and policies of
genocide.94

Given the outcry disclosure about economic motives for its wars would create for the
government and corporations guiding the USA military adventures,95 they must
continue to mask both domestically and internationally their motives, regardless of the
88
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international ridicule their patent falsehoods may draw. Instead of forthrightness, the
USA tends to rely on its trade laws.96 As former Commissioner of Australian Trade
Practices Commission, Professor Warren Pengilley, observes, “Because it [USA] had
no widespread territorial base upon which to enact protective trade legislation, the
United States sought in its laws to enact legislation principles never previously a part
of international law.”97

A favourite cover for USA motives, is the oft repeated pretext of “national security”.
For example, its embargo of Cuba was advanced on “national security” grounds. It
was so transparently ridiculous, that a Mexican diplomat explained his country’s
refusal to support the embargo by saying “if we publicly declare that Cuba is a threat
to our security forty million Mexicans will die laughing.”98 Indeed, the USA
instigated the Cuban problem by imposing sanctions against Cuba’s sugar exports—
its main cash crop export, to which Cuba responded by confiscating USA property.99

This approach is reflected in its laws concerning foreign commerce, and in particular
its “effects,” “personal extension” and “contractual submission” doctrines.100 Each of
these legal doctrines is a transparent attempt to extend USA laws beyond territorial or
jurisdictional limits otherwise recognized by international law. These laws serve to
advance USA foreign policy, particularly, the export of USA’s values101 as well as its
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economic interests.

Despite its free market rhetoric, USA trade policy is anything

but free trade. Consider, for example, that under the supposed liberalization of trade
under Reagan.102 In the Reagan era the USA implemented three times more
protectionist policies than any other developed country.103 As Pengilley observes, one
cannot neatly divide foreign policy, trade and competition.104

In his enlightening and powerful article, “United States Self Interest: A Major
Impediment to Agreement on the Principles of International Competition and its
Enforcement,”105 Pengilley, has demonstrated amply the USA does nothing but
advance its self-interests usually with just those same policies. It is not being argued
that the USA should act contrary to its self-interest, but that it should take a broader
perspective of its self-interest and consider reciprocity as an important principle in its
foreign policy.106 As Pengilley observes, the USA “has a plethora of statutes aimed at
advancing its cause to the detriment of its competitors.” 107 This approach is rather
surprising as it occurs despite the supposed lessons from the Great Depression and in
particular, the problem associated with the beggar-thy-neighbour policies.108

This use of law, clearly contrary to economic good, seems particularly inappropriate
for a nation committed to the Rule of Law. But this is not the only odd or
contradictory use of law by the self-proclaimed beacon of the Rule of Law. Indeed
congress created laws purporting to give the USA international jurisdiction contrary
102
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to well recognized and accepted international law109 and the courts have upheld these
doctrines of extraterritoriality. Perhaps the classic case, although later modified in
response to world opprobrium,110 is the judgment in US. v. Aluminum Co. of
America111 in which the court stated: “Any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not with its allegiance for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its border which the state reprehends.”112

These USA claims of jurisdiction are widely, and with good reason, regarded as
imperialistic:113 when other countries have attempted to enact reciprocating legislation
the USA has refused to recognize such legislation.114 Pengilley concludes “The
United States has, to date, used its world trading position, and the necessity for
virtually the whole world to trade with it, as a basis both for enacting self-interested
legislation and subjecting the trading world to it.”115

In light of this information and perspective with respect to USA foreign policy, we
may ask: was Australia entitled to believe it would receive any special treatment in
the Australia-USA FTA based on friendship? There are two ways to develop an
answer to the question. First, one can examine the actual negotiations and outcome of
the negotiations in the FTA. Second, one can examine the outcome in terms of
economics and in particular ecological economics.

109
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6) THE AUSTRALIA-USA FTA

United States twice made overtures to Australia for Free Trade Agreement, and both
times it was rejected.116 Nevertheless, on 14 November, 2002, Australia instigated117
negotiations with the United States for a bi-lateral trade deal.118 In October 2004,
Australia entered the Free Trade Agreement. The speed with which agreement was
reached seems to have surprised Australians.119

Australia considers itself a friend of the USA. As Prime Minister John Howard
repeatedly advised Australians that the FTA was based on the “friendship” or a
“special relationship” between the countries. Indeed, the trade agreement was
premised to a certain degree on this notion. Such advice, however, should be taken
with a note of caution.

a) Friends & Interests in International Relations
Lord Palmerston, defending his foreign policy in the House of Commons in the midnineteenth century remarked, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to
follow."120 This perspective continues to inform foreign policy among contemporary
nation states, and certainly includes the USA. Clearly, one must put such quaint
notions as friendship aside and leave them for the popular press. Indeed, the reality of
116
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the situation, was made evident in parliament when the member from Murray-Darling
pointed out how the USA’s “enemy,” Cuba, has a better market access for its sugar
than does Australia.121 Such talk is merely governments obfuscating an issue that
ought to be thoroughly and thoughtfully debated in public. That aside, what has been
the basis for or justification of the FTA?

b) Economic Benefits
Australia purportedly wanted to enter the FTA to avoid being overtaken by other
tropical countries, particularly in Latin America, particularly with respect to its trade
in agriculture.122 Initially, the Australian government claimed gains, in the
neighbourhood of $4 billion per annum over a ten year period.123 Access to USA
markets for Australian agricultural products were used to promote support for the
FTA.124 The Australian government boasted that 66% of agricultural tariffs would be
eliminated immediately, and a further 9% reduced to zero within four years.125 The
Australian government also claimed elimination of 97% of US tariff lines in nonagricultural exports (but, textiles and clothing would not be included).126 Access to
USA government procurement market was also touted as a benefit,127 as was access
for Australian service providers.128
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It is interesting to note how these benefits are evaluated by economists. The
Australian government commissioned report, conducted by the Centre for
International Economics (CIE) suggested significantly larger GDP gains of $6.1
billion per annum for the period 2005-2015.129 This projection amounts to a $61
billion gain in the GNP for the period. Alternative modelling, however, based on
econometrics presents a dramatically different outcome. Indeed, the study prepared by
the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR), indicates a
potential change to the Australian economy of -$47 billion over the same period.130
The depth and breadth of the NIEIR study and its criticisms levelled against the CIE
study incline one to accept the NIEIR’s view of the matter.131

On the USA side, The Wall Street Journal called the pact a “no brainer” as USA is
already running a $9 billion surplus on $28 billion of trade with Australia.132 Further,
as Senator Grassley of the USA Finance Committee observed it will immediately
eliminate Australian industrial tariffs on 99% of products.133 The only USA objection
to the FTA came from labour and certain special interest groups like agriculture and
textiles.134 The USA also emphasized the benefit to its agricultural industries which
export $400 million to Australia as part of the duty free goods resulting from the
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FTA.135 USA estimates were that the FTA with Australia will increase USA exports
by approximately $2 billion per annum.136 The basis for claiming the agreement is so
one-sided will be examined next.

c) The Agreement
Australia had a number of objectives and concerns in negotiating the FTA.
Australia’s science based quarantine which has kept Australia’s agriculture industry
free of significant pests,137 was a concern that Australia wished to protect.138
In the negotiations, Australia was not able to keep its quarantine measures in place.
The USA demanded and received concessions from Australia claiming that the
quarantine measures were non-tariff barriers to trade and not proven by USA science.
Australia lost.

Australia has a Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) that makes medicines
available to Australians at low cost.139 Australia was promised by its government that
the FTA would not effect the PBS. The USA framed the PBS as an impediment to the
USA’s pharmaceutical industry’s competition in the Australian market. It therefore
demanded and received as a concession from Australia changes to the PBS which will
have far reaching negative effects for the average Australian.
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Further, Australia maintained a policy of supporting domestic industry which
benefited Australia – much like its American counterpart “Made in USA” policy –
and was an important part of Australia’s national economic policy.140 This policy too
came up for scrutiny in the negotiations. The USA demanded and received
concessions putting an end to this policy.

Finally, up until the FTA negotiations, Australia followed its own intellectual
property polices which were in line with international standards. Nevertheless, it gave
in to USA demands for “evergreening”141 intellectual property laws—laws which
extend copyrights and patents by permitting dubious patent applications by current
patent holders which work to thwart generic competitors. This later provision ensures
an extended stream of royalties will flow into the USA for years after they would
normally have ceased.142 In sum, Australia failed to achieve its objectives in four
vital areas: quarantine, medicines, government procurement, and intellectual property.

Despite these significant failures, certainly it should be expected that rationality
would prevail with respect to the more obvious, less controversial items—items of
trade which form the basis for arguments for trade. While certainly tropical fruits
could be grown anywhere including the polar regions (given enough energy inputs in
matters of light, heat, and fertilizer, much as one can make icebergs in the tropics), it
does not take an economist to realize that it is a misallocation of resources to do so.
Australia is a tropical and semi-tropical continent. As such, its citrus and sugar
industries constitute a significant proportion of its agricultural produce. It would be
140
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instructive therefore to examine how these products faired in the FTA. The case of
sugar will be examined, with the caveat that while it is not necessarily a typical
example of how goods were dealt with between these two developed nations, it serves
as an exemplar of the nature of the problem which is the focus of the balance of this
paper.

7) CASE STUDY: SUGAR
In Australia and the USA various studies were undertaken to estimate the losses and
gains which could result from truly free trade between the two nations’ peoples with
respect to sugar. On the Australian side, potential gains from reduced tariffs on sugar
were estimated at $4 billion.143 Although not unaware of the USA sugar subsidies
and restrictions, it was indicated in preliminary discussions to the Australian Senate
Subcommittee that agriculture including exports of sugar144 to the USA were open to
negotiation. This openness was certainly important to Australia as Minister Vaile had
declared that access to USA markets for agriculture and sugar in particular were
specific objectives.145 Neo-liberal Prime Minister John Howard adamantly asserted
that sugar would not be excluded from the FTA. His assertions proved not to be true
and the USA announced in February 2004 that its sugar industry would not be
effected.146 USA sugar producers had indicated to USA negotiators that granting
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Australian access to USA markets would likely destroy their industry costing 66,000
jobs, which if expanded to the sweetener industry would encompass 226,000 jobs.147
Before looking at the specifics of the FTA negotiations, it is worthwhile to review the
historical and global background to the international sugar trade and the respective
domestic environments of both the USA and Australia.

Over the course of sugar’s long history as part of human civilization it has changed
from a luxury item to a basic food commodity.148 Sugar is among the world’s most
commonly traded, imported and regulated commodities. The global sugar market is
in excess of 119 million tonnes per annum.149 The five main exporters are the EU,
Brazil, Australia, Thailand, and Cuba.150 It is often commented that the sugar market
is the most distorted market among the world’s commodities151 with approximately a
third sold pursuant to special arrangements, meaning, outside of a free market.152
Sugar, as a commodity has experienced considerable volatility largely related to
government interventions, on the world markets.153 In the last two decades it has
ranged from $0.404 in 1985154 to $0.1344 in 1995155 per pound.
147
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a) USA Sugar Programs and Policies
Sugar in the USA is governed by a complex legal regime156 which maintains a
number of supports for the local sugar industry. These supports are a complex of
import taxes,157 special loans,158 market supports, and marketing fee assessments.159
The import taxes amount to approximately 100% of the cost of raw sugar as measured
against the Caribbean raw sugar price, (which is usually considered the base price).160
Commitments by the USA government to date have been to reduce import taxes on
second tier-duty (the tier after a quota has been filled) for raw cane sugar to $0.1582
per pound and $0.1621 per pound for refined sugar.161 The USA operates both
internal supports and external subsidies for its sugar industry. Government subsidies
cost the USA consumers between $800 million and $1.9 billion per annum.162

Although the USA itself is also a major producer, its total sugar production is
insufficient for the demands of its domestic market. As a result of this insufficient
production combined with the distortions caused by the USA government’s subsidy
programs by which it acquires domestically produced sugar, the USA is in the bizarre
position of having large quantities of sugar to dump on the world market, while its
importers bring in 1.25 million tons of sugar annually.163
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Economists’ modelling leads them to estimate that without these supports and
subsidies that the world sugar prices would increase by a dramatic 61%,164 effectively
transferring the majority of the gain to the major, poor southern producers.

With respect to production, USA growers produced $960 million worth of sugar in
2003.165 Among its states, subtropical Florida is a major sugar producer. The
efficiency of cane growth in subtropical areas, however, is questionable: Florida cane
growers produce approximately 1/3 to ¼ of the amount per acres of growers in
tropical climates. 166 Florida yields are approximately 34.5 tons of cane per acre.167

b) Australia Sugar Programs and Policies
Australia too has a significant sugar industry with a long history including at times,
considerable government intervention.168 Sugar production is spread along some
2,100 kms of Australia’s eastern coast in the states of Queensland and New South
Wales,169 with the former accounting for 94% of the production and the latter 5%.170
Australian exports supply about 12% of the world market.171 The Australian
government first enacted legislation to comply with the International Sugar
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Agreement of the 1930’s.172 Subsequently, the commonwealth and Queensland state
governments negotiated an embargo on the importation of white sugar which pursuant
to the Queensland Sugar Agreements lasted until 1989.173 Since that time there has
been a successive reduction on tariffs.174 In terms of Australia’s export market, sugar
is its second most important crop, following wheat.175

The sugar export market is operated exclusively by the Queensland Sugar
Corporation, a state operated enterprise established pursuant to legislation.176
Queensland exports about 80% of its raw sugar and has receipts of about AUD$2.0
billion, per annum.177 Although Australia abolished its embargo on imported sugar, it
too continues to protect its sugar industry, with a tariff at a rate of $38 per tonne.178
Annual production is approximately 5.0 million tonnes.179

Given its tropical climate, Australia’s sugar production is efficient. Yield is
approximately 80-100 tonnes of cane per acre.180 Prior to the FTA, Australia’s sugar
quota with the USA was 87,000 tonnes—the equivalent of two boatloads per
annum.181 USA producers realized that if Australian producers were granted a level
playing field, Australians would sell a much larger proportion of their sugar crop to
the USA and destroy the USA sugar industry.182 Accordingly, they lobbied the
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government which succumbing to pressure to protect USA domestic corporate
producers simply refused to grant Australia a level playing field. As a result,
Australia did not improve by one iota access for one of its major agricultural export
products: sugar. Sugar is explicitly and completely excluded from the FTA,183 and
Australia, despite its rather dramatic concessions, continues to be limited to its quota
of a mere two boatloads—exactly the same as before the FTA.

8) EVALUATING THE FTA FOR FAIRNESS

Having demonstrated a considerable number of losses, economically, and
ecologically, are there other justifications that need to be considered before engaging
in an evaluation of the FTA for fairness?

a) Benefits and explanations
The Australian government claims that one of the main motivations for the FTA was
its political and military alliance with the USA – already made firm by the ANZUS
treaty. The incumbent Prime Minister emphasizes the USA’s role in defeating the
Pacific’s imperial power, Japan, in the Second World War.184 This argument seems
weak if not altogether specious. Surely, there are no powers in the Pacific greater

D.C. Jan. 21, 2003. 1-2, See also Submission of the American Sugar Alliance, Office of the United
States Trade Representative, United States Department of labor, Request for Public Comment on
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than Australia with the exceptions of China and Japan. Japan, however, has given up
its imperial designs and its constitution expressly forbids the development of an
offensive military force.185 And China is more than sufficiently occupied with its
domestic and regional problems including Taiwan, Tibet, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan all of which border on the Xinjiang Province,
not to mention the troubles it has had with India and Vietnam on the outside186 and
other ethnic groups within. In the most unlikely event that China were to invade
Australia, it is very difficult to imagine the USA becoming involved, particularly
since China is the leading foreign buyer of USA Treasury Bonds second only to
Japan.187

Were any lesser power to attack and were Australia unable to repel it, the United
States would intervene in any such situation on account of its own interests188—
indeed, the aggressiveness and complete disregard for the rights and interests of other
sovereign nations is one of the main complaints brought against the USA.189
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Given Australia’s rejection of two prior approaches for an FTA by the USA, there
was some concern about the priority USA would accord to Australia.190 Despite
much assurance from Mr. Deady of the Department of Trade that it was an important
agreement receiving full attention from the USA, the USA’s Office of the Trade
Representative mentions the Australian FTA in a mere paragraph while extolling the
coup of other agreements with Chile and Central America.191

Other parties in favour of the FTA were the Business Council of Australia and some
other smaller industries that have considerable trade with the USA. The Business
Council of Australia is made up of Australia’s largest corporations, many of which are
controlled or at least closely tied to USA corporations.192 These corporations have no
interest in Australia’s well-being. These other parties have been harassed by the
USA’s notorious and unending barrage of litigation and trade complaints to such a
degree that an agreement with nearly no concessions but which may smooth their
access to the USA markets is better than the current situation.193

It would appear that Australia had already given away most of its tradable chips prior
to entering into the negotiation. Accordingly, it was left with nothing with which to
extract concessions, and essentially, received none. The USA merely sat silently as
Australia put its last available concessions on the table, then made some further
demands with the resulting agreement as it is. Authors of the NIEIR economic impact

190

See Questions of Senator Cook in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee of the Australian
Senate, above n. 106.
191
The President's 2003 Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program “Regional and Bilateral
Trade Negotiations” Ch. 3 of Report
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_Trade_Policy_Agenda
/asset_upload_file392_4753.pdf
192
Weiss above, n. 14, p, 18.
193
Ibid, p, 17-18.

55256-text.native.1157935488

40

study observe: “the AUSFTA is a partnership of unequals. This is likely to be
expressed in terms of the senior partner being highly litigious towards anything
Australia wants to do and highly arbitrary in terms of what if wants to do.”194

A further matter for concern is Australia’s level of commitment to the FTA.
Australia’s federal system has granted to the commonwealth government
constitutional power to bind the individual states. Accordingly, individual Australian
states cannot block or reject the FTA, nor can there be any changes to the agreement
once signed. By way of contrast, as Pengilley points out: “USA does not bind itself to
treaties—individual states can accept or reject any trade agreements negotiated by the
federal government, and there is therefore little, if anything, binding the USA side in a
trade agreement.”195 Accordingly, any state can create legislation to block any aspect
of the FTA it does not like. Furthermore, despite its signature by the President of the
United States, the FTA must pass Congress when the President has not been granted
Fast Track Authority. In such instances, Congress is free to make whatever changes it
desires.196

b) Analysis of Economic Fairness
We turn now to consider economic fairness in the FTA. FTA’s always have the
appearance of fairness. Quite simply, each side commits to the same language in the
document. Generally, the provisions governing the rights and duties of the parties are
mirrors of one another. Of course, then, the FTA’s must be fair, or must they? If we
return to consider Suranovic’s framework for analysing fairness in this FTA we will
be able to make an informed evaluation. Of particular concern are his Positive
194
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Reciprocity Fairness, Privacy Fairness, and Maximum Benefit Fairness. On none of
these criteria can the FTA be declared a successful or fair deal.

The FTA fails the Positive Reciprocity Fairness test. This test requires that effects
which carry a value (negative or positive) be reciprocated. The FTA appears to be
heavily weighted in favour of the USA which stands to gain $42 billion while leaving
Australia with a loss of approximately $47 billion on a twenty year horizon. The
second aspect of the test deals with loyalty and betrayal. Loyalty is important
because, as Suranovic observes, it “confers benefits on other individuals or groups
who have taken actions beneficial to you.”197 In the case at hand, Australia has
conferred benefits on the United States, particularly by its participation in the
unpopular Iraq invasion. Further, positive reciprocity fairness requires that benefits
that accrue are approximately equal.198 Again, as demonstrated above, the FTA
certainly does not have this outcome, and most certainly not in the case of Australia’s
second most important agricultural export, sugar. It includes notions about the
reciprocal diminution of tariffs. Again, Australia gains access on many goods after a
four year period while the USA gains immediate access for most of its goods.

The mirror language of the FTA hides the real outcomes of law. Perhaps the most
famous illustration of this truism is Anatoile de France’s aphorism: “The law, in its
majestic equality, forbids the rich and the poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in
the streets, and to steal bread.” For example, the FTA’s provisions with respect to
intellectual property law will greatly harm Australia while greatly benefiting the USA.
Australia is a net importer of intellectual property: the USA is a net exporter.
197
198
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Australia’s efforts to increase its strength as a knowledge based economy through
various protections and subsidies has been given away under the FTA. The USA will
benefit for a long time from Australia’s surrender of this precious resource.

Privacy Fairness is the fairness that results from parties being able to act freely with
respect to actions which have bearing only on themselves. In international trade,
Suranovic identifies this fairness as involving national sovereignty.199 As previously
noted,200 the USA’s legal doctrines of “effects,” “personal extension” and “contractual
submission” have the opposite intent and effect. The costs of this submission to USA
dominance are considerable.201 It includes USA interference with the quarantine
system and involvement with and undermining of Australia’s pharmaceutical benefits
scheme. Further, the changes imposed on Australia’s intellectual property regime are
invasive. The FTA fails this test as well.

What are Australia’s options? Clearly, it did not learn from Canada’s hard learned
lesson with the USA from NAFTA202 nor Mexico’s with the same.203 Australia is
stuck with the FTA the way it is. It can withdraw from the FTA only on its terms.

9) CONCLUSION
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In the global picture, it is evident that small countries are not about to be treated fairly
or equitably by the USA, and by extension, one may assume by other larger trading
blocks. Even in the face of obvious ecological benefits and economic harms, the
developed nations are not about to give way to the needs or interests of the
underdeveloped and poor.

Sugar, like all agricultural products, is a very important commodity for tropical
producers. Much has been made of the harm done to poor countries by the current
subsidies regime.204 For example, UNCTAD has indicated that in West Africa, the
increase in revenues resulting from free trade would be about $1.0 billion,205 more
than all the aid those countries receive combined. An UNCTAD study modelling the
relative harms and gains of duty and quota free trading regime indicates that gains to
LDC’s (Less Developed Countries) resulting form reductions in subsidy programs
would be dramatic while causing minimal disruption in the quad countries (USA, EU,
Japan, and Canada).206 Nevertheless, despite the great humanitarian benefit to those
suffering in poverty and the minimal disruption to the wealthy corporations and their
employees, the rich countries simply refuse.207 Indeed, the developed countries
refusal to implement their promises concerning reduction in agricultural subsidies has
seriously undermined their credibility among trading partners on other issues. As
204
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noted in the UNCTAD report prepared in 2000 “LDCs continue to face peak MFN
rates for… sugar and sugar products.”208

Because of its market size and dominance, there is no free trade if the markets of the
USA are not involved.209 Poor countries who depend on their agricultural
commodities have suffered greatly. Commodity prices have declined over the last
three decades and the poor countries in the tropics have borne the brunt of this
decline.210 Although there may be some argument for maintaining national
agricultural programs for food security policies, the reality is that these have largely
out-lived their usefulness. Indeed, agriculture makes up but a small fraction of
international trade—merely 13%.211 Notwithstanding this marginal amount, wealthy
countries are not about to give in.
It is important to consider the significance of this refusal in terms of poverty
reduction. Oxfam reports:
The human costs of unfair trade are immense. If Africa, East Asia, South Asia,
and Latin America were each to increase their share of world exports by one
per cent, the resulting gains in income could lift 128 million people out of
poverty. Reduced poverty would contribute to improvements in other areas,
such as child health and education….
The World Bank acknowledges that this trend continues despite the collapse of trade
talks in Cancun in 2003. As David de Ferranti, a World Bank Vice-President
observed in March 2004:
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Analysis by the World Bank and others indicates that major global trade opening
in agriculture could provide a substantial boost to the developing world as a
whole, and to many poor rural producers. Yet the existing barriers and subsidies in
agriculture are defended by highly-entrenched lobbies in a number of the OECD
countries.212
Beyond these direct economic harms, scholars Michel Damian and Jean-Christophe
Graz note, “Free trade damages the social structure in countries of the South,
especially where women and small farmers are concerned.”213 Yet, this is the system
increasingly being imposed on us.
The evidence is clear: international trade as driven by the USA214 is stacked against
the small, the weak and the poor. Even in the case of Australia, a developed nation
with a “special relationship” with the USA, with all the benefits nature could bestow
to grow tropical produce, the larger more powerful nation, the USA demonstrated no
intention of creating a level field. It is as if the FTA were another instance of friendly
fire, where allies kill each other on the battle field. Regardless of the motive and
rhetoric, the outcome is the same.
This rather discouraging analysis begs for resolution. What alternatives are there?
Certainly, given the government’s misrepresentation of the situation, citizens cannot
count on support for justice there. It turns citizens concerned about justice back to the
fundamental tools we have always had: citizen activism, true democracy.215 While
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not swift, where persistent, it has always been the most effective weapon against the
powerful elite who continue to choose to run the planet, its people and resources into
dust for their own pitiful gains.
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